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SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, IP SUBCOMMITTEE
JUNE 4, 2019
I. INTRODUCTION
Joshua D. Sarnoff is a Professor of Law at DePaul University,
received the 2018 DePaul Spirit of Inquiry Award, and has received
numerous awards for his scholarship. He is an internationally
recognized expert on the intersections of intellectual property law,
environmental law, health law, and constitutional, administrative,
and international law. From January 2014 to July 2015, he served as
the Thomas A. Edison Distinguished Scholar at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. In June 2019, he testified before the Intellectual
Property Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on
pending legislation to revise subject matter eligibility doctrine under
Section 101 of the Patent Act.
II. TRANSCRIPT
This written testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff, Professor of
Law, DePaul University was submitted to the Intellectual Property
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee for its hearing on
June 4, 2019, and addresses the Legislative Draft of May 22, 2019
to revise patent eligible subject matter. The testimony makes nine
basic points:
(1) the current uncertainty in eligibility doctrine does not
justify the pending legislative efforts to eliminate existing
protection for the public domain of scientific, natural, and
fundamental discoveries ("science, nature, and ideas");
(2) the pending legislative revision proposals do not address
the root causes of the doctrinal uncertainty;
(3) the pending proposals, by restricting the public domain
and displacing line-drawing creativity judgments, would not
harmonize U.S. patent law with that of other countries;
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(4) the current, judicially interpreted requirement of Section
101 to treat ineligible novel discoveries of science, nature, and ideas
as prior art against applicants claiming practical applications thereof
is good innovation and moral policy;
(5) by minimizing reliance on eligibility doctrine to
determine patent validity, the pending proposals would increase
uncertainty in and costs of the patent system;
(6) the pending proposals would expand the utility patent
system to aesthetic and other forms of non-technological creativity,
by removing consideration of the kind of novel creativity from
eligibility determinations;
(7) expanding the patent system to eliminate the exclusions
for science, nature, and ideas and to authorize as eligible claims to
most or all practical, technological applications of nontechnological
creativity likely will be held unconstitutional, generating further
legal uncertainty;
(8) trying to avoid those results by more clearly defining
"specific," "practical" and "technological" utility will prove at least
as difficult as addressing directly the requisite kind of eligible
creativity through Section 101's eligible novelty doctrine; and
(9) if Congress proceeds to revise eligibility doctrine, it
should adopt specific measures to minimize uncertainty, litigation,
and the need for further legislative revisions. 1
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides the "eligibility"
criteria for the types of things generated by the kinds of creativity
that can be patented as a utility patent "invention," as well as
Sarnoff, Joshua D., Testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearing: The State of Patent
Eligibility in America: Part I (June 4, 2019). Abstract. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572387
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requiring that such creative things be "useful."1 Other sections of
the Patent Act, impose "patentability" restrictions on the grant of
utility patent rights, as the "quid pro quo" for granting exclusive
rights to such nonobvious inventions.2
At the most basic level, the purpose of Section 101's subject
matter eligibility doctrine is therefore to distinguish the kinds of
mental creativity (invention) that (subject to patentability
requirements) warrant granting utility patent rights in products or
processes from the kinds that do not. 3 It is important to acknowledge
that there is a serious problem of the degree of uncertainty regarding
the perceived purposes and the interpretation and application of
current eligibility doctrine, beyond the normal legal uncertainty of
applying general legislation to specific cases.4 Although the
language of the eligibility provision has remained essentially
unchanged since the 1793 Patent Act, the doctrine has been
inconsistently interpreted and applied by the courts over the entire
time frame, and particularly since the 1970s. 5
But Congress cannot provide the needed clarity and
consistency by legislative language revisions to Section 101 alone.
Nor can it do so merely by displacing to other patent law doctrines
the difficult but required judgments of the kinds of creativity that do
or do not warrant utility patent rights. 6 Adequately addressing the
root causes of the failures of judicial and administrative
interpretative and adjudicative decisional processes would require
changes that go well beyond the scope of any contemplated
legislative revisions. Enacting some such measures into law may
pose serious separation-of-powers concerns, rendering them
constitutionally suspect.7
Sarnoff, Joshua D., Testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearing: The State of Patent
Eligibility in America: Part I (June 4, 2019). Page 3. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572387
3 Id.
4 Id. at 4.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
2
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The current legislative proposals will not achieve greater
harmonization with other countries' patent laws, but rather will
achieve the opposite effect. 8 In order to achieve such harmonization,
Congress would have to transfer the difficult line-drawing
judgments currently performed under Section 101's eligibility
doctrine to Section 103's non-obviousness standard, known around
the world as the "inventive step" requirement. Congress would have
to do so while: (a) retaining the eligibility exclusions from the
meaning of "invention" for science, nature, and ideas; and (b)
preventing the creativity of those ineligible discoveries from
contributing to the technological character of the claim evaluated
for non-obviousness.9 None of the pending proposals would do so;
most seek both to eliminate these historic, world-wide exclusions
and to avoid having to make those line-drawing non-obviousness
judgments.10
Expanding the U.S. patent eligibility to include such things
as business methods and aesthetics, much less scientific, natural,
and abstract discoveries, would place U.S. law in greater, not lesser,
tension with the patent law of other jurisdictions. 11 This would
further complicate international prosecution and enforcement
efforts.12 No such changes are required in order to comply with the
World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement. And increasingly,
such patents will go to foreign entities, transferring wealth from the
U.S. to other countries.13
If Congress is to play a constructive role in further clarifying
the law of eligibility (without addressing problems of the quality of
8

Sarnoff, Joshua D., Testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearing: The State of Patent
Eligibility in America: Part I (June 4, 2019). Page 11. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572387.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 12.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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adjudication more generally), it (a) should provide in legislative
language, not just in legislative history, and as clearly and
specifically as possible, the requirements for adjudication and the
considerations and policies that such adjudication should be based
on.14 In particular, Congress (b) should explicitly preserve the
public domain of science, nature, and ideas by requiring in clear
legislative language that such ineligible discoveries must be treated
as prior art against the applicant once those discoveries are disclosed
for public benefit in a patent specification. 15 Congress also (c)
should explicitly abrogate further consideration of or reliance on
"preemption" concerns, which can be and are better managed by
Section 112's claim scope doctrines.16 Finally, Congress (d) should
expressly abrogate prior inconsistent judicial precedents under
Section 101 that conflict with the new legislative language75 These
conflicting precedents have continued to induce the PTO to grant
and the courts to uphold countless patents for uncreative but
practical applications of ineligible discoveries of science, nature and
ideas that should not be part of the patent system. 17 To simplify
matters, Congress might simply abrogate all precedents under
Section 101 and its predecessor provisions, requiring the PTO and
judges to start from a clean slate when interpreting and applying
such new legislative language. 18

III. JOSHUA D. SARNOFF ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
FOR THE RECORD OF SENATOR RICHARD
BLUMENTHAL, SUBMITTED TO SENATE JUDICIARY
14

Sarnoff, Joshua D., Testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearing: The State of Patent
Eligibility in America: Part I (June 4, 2019). Page 23. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572387.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, HON. LINDSAY O. GRAHAM
JUNE 4, 2019 SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY HEARING ON “THE STATE OF PATENT
ELIGIBILITY IN AMERICA: PART I” JUNE 26, 2019
Q: What impact will broadening the subject matter that can be
patented have on consumers?
A: As with the effects on industry, the effects on consumers in the
long run are highly uncertain, given the inability to predict how
patents affect dynamic innovation and how industries within
markets will choose to license, compete, and price products and
services (subject to different government regulatory, antitrust, and
other policies). Nevertheless, we know that patents in general
impose so-called "deadweight" losses on society by increasing costs
and decreasing access to patented goods relative to the competitive
alternatives that might be available in markets in the absence of such
patents. Thus, we can be reasonably sure that patents will
adversely affect consumers in the short run, and cannot have any
confidence that patents will increase consumer welfare in the long
run.
As I indicated in my written testimony, granting patent rights by
extending patent eligibility imposes numerous harms in many fields
of "technology" (or for products or processes that cannot be
considered technological inventions) to which the patent system
will be extended. But knowing that these harms may occur is
different from accurately predicting their specific nature and
magnitude. The opportunity costs of such eligibility extensions are
likely immense. But the specific harms and their magnitude also are
essentially unknowable. To evaluate such costs would require
predicting and valuing outcomes that would not otherwise occur and
thus could be assessed only in a counter-factual universe.
Q: Could the proposed reforms increase consumer prices? If so,
in what industries or on what products?
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A: As indicated above, the proposed reforms could and likely will
increase prices simply by the fact that patents provide rights to
exclude competition that would otherwise occur and that might
then lead to decreased prices and increased access to the same or
similar products. But predicting whether they would increase
prices significantly in particular industries, or for which particular
products, would require speculation for which concrete evidence
and theory are lacking.
More importantly, the specific amount of price increases for
particular industries or products will depend on numerous factors,
including: (1) the scope of claims granted in particular patents; (2)
the degree to which competitors develop substitute technologies that
can be produced for the public that do not infringe patent rights, and
complementary technologies that must be cross-licensed in order to
produce products for the public; and (3) regulatory and antitrust
policies. A vigorous debate currently exists, e.g., as to whether on
the one hand "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" (FRAND)
licensing policies adopted by standard-setting organizations (SSOs)
are sufficient to assure that patent rights do not result in excessive
prices for consumers and that patents can be efficiently crosslicensed to produce complex consumer products, and on the other
hand whether such requirements sufficiently protect SSOparticipating patent holders against holdouts by non-participating
patent holders and against infringers (in the absence of injunctive
relief). See generally, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST,
AND PATENTS (Jorge L. Contreras ed. 2017).
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